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TRANSPORTATION LEGISLATION AND
FUEL SHORTAGES
WILLIAM

E. THOMS*

What appeared to be the biggest threat to the established travel
patterns of Americans since the Great Epizootic of 18721 has apparently declined to manageable proportions. Nonetheless, the 1973 Arab
boycott of petroleum exports and the resulting gasoline shortages and
attempts at rationing did bring about much oratory and some changes
in our system of transportation law so as to alter the role of the
private automobile as compared to other forms of transportation.
Since 1960, our entire transportation system, with the exception
of less than one thousand route-miles of electric railroad, rapid transit in six cities, 2 streetcars in eight cities, 3 and inclines, trolley
buses and other electric vehicles in a handful of communities, has
been dependent upon petroleum products. 4 Most important of these
is gasoline, which is predominantly utilized by private automobiles. 5
Encouraging drivers to switch to other modes of travel would thus
result in more efficient use of energy and prevent the complete isolation of persons or regions for lack of transportation. The automobile is one of the least efficient modes of travel in terms of fuel economy, while the passenger train and intercity bus are the most
efficient.6 Whether by rationing, taxes, or selective price increases, encouraging use of other modes will reduce consumption and reliance
on foreign oil. A rural area such as North Dakota would thus be
able to obtain sufficient petroleum for agricultural uses, even if Cana* B.A., Colgate 1961; J.D., Yale 1964; M.C.L. Tulane 1971. Associate Professor of Law,
University of North Dakota; and Research Associate, Upper Great Plains Transportation
Institute. The author wishes to thank law students Stuart A. Larson and David Tiiatola
for their assistance.
1, The Great Epizootic was an epidcmic among horses, which reached North America
in 1870 and culminated two years later. During this time, virtually no horses were available for local transportation, which compelled street railways to turn to technology to bail
them out. The resulting development of the cable car by Hallidle in 1873 and the tteolley
car by Sprague in the following decade changed traffic patterns and made available the
phenomena of commutation and the spreading urban patterns which we know today.
2. Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Chicago and San Francisco.
3. Boston, Newark, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, New Orleans, Ft. Worth and
San Francisco.
4. G. HILTON, THE TRANSPORTATION AcT or 1958 at 11,303-305 (1960).
5.
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6. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE RAIL PASSENGER SERVICE AaT OF 1970 'Y
U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, Append. C at it (1974).
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dian sources no longer will supply the area. Furthermore, fuel saved
in trabsportation could be allocated instead to the important job of
heating homes and maintaining industry during the winter months.7
Although a comprehensive energy policy bill never was enacted,
the 1973-74 session of Congress did provide for a number of measures to aid public transportation and to encourage the development
of alternate transit facilities. Whether the impetus which inspired
this change will survive the apparent, if temporary, easing of fuel
shortages remains to be seen.
I. THE AMTRAK IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1973
Probably the most visible symbol of the Nixon administration's involvement in the transportation picture is the pointless arrow
of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak). Created
by the Rail Passenger Service of 1970, s the government-sponsored
but privately owned corporation has had responsibility for the operation of most intercity rail passenger service since May 1, 1971. 9
The corporation at its outset was severely under-funded, operated
on an extremely conservative basis, and operating less than half the
number of the passenger trains under private management on April
30, 1971.10 Many critics believed Amtrak's chief attraction to the
railroads was that it permitted them to quietly shed their commoncarrier responsibilities for the carriage of passengers, and that the
purpose of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation was to preside over the gradual liquidation of the passenger business. 1
Events conspired to make this prediction unrealistic. Despite all
the handicaps besetting it, Amtrak became a modest success, reducing deficits while increasing its passenger loads. 12 Train travel gained
a certain amount of respectability and became politically popular. 1
And finally, 1973's fuel shortages, culminating in the Arab oil boycott
and threat of rationing, drove passengers en masse to train travel.
Amtrak's patronage is now running five years ahead of optimistic
projections and the carrier had to turn away hundreds of would-be
passengers daily by early 1974.14
7. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 627 (1973).
8. 45 U.S.C. 501 (1970).
9. See generally JOURNEY TO AMTRAK (H. Edmonson, ed. 1972); W. THOMS, REPRIEVIE
FOR THE IRON HORSE (1973); Harbeson, The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 38 Icc
PRAC. J. 330 (1971); Thorns, Amtrak: Rail Renaissance or Requiem?, 49 CHI-KNT L.
REV. 29 (1972); Thorns, Regulation of Passenger Train Discontinuances; 22 J. Pus. L.
103 (1973) ; Note, The Railroad Passenger Problem; American and British Experiences as
Bases for a New Model, 7 U. MICH. L.J. REF. 155 (1973).
10. W.
THOMS, REPRIEVE FOR THE IRON HORSE 48-52
(1973). See generally JOURNEY TO
AMTRAK (H. Edmonson ed. 1972).
11. Editorial, "Railroad Mercy Killing", N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1970, at 10 E, col. 4.
12. See Thorns, Amtrak Revisited, 5 TRANSP. L.J. 141 (1973).
13. Id.
14. Winter 1973-74 PASSENGER TRAIN JOURNAL 4.
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Clearly, a law that was designed as a holding action to preserve
a skeletal passenger system in 1970 was not equipped to cope with
these developments. It is not surprising, therefore, that Congress has
thrice amended the Amtrak Act, and shows little reluctance to continually supervise the quality of its operations. ,
Amtrak had been operating for a little over a year when its enabling law was first amended. 16 The 1972 amendments represented
a change in emphasis from the original for-profit concept of the corporation, and a shift from executive to legislative control over operations.17
Congressional dissatisfaction with Amtrak's go-slow approach and
with real or imagined interference with Amtrak expansion plans by
the administration and railroad influence on transportation policy produced the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1973.18 The new law amends
the Rail Passenger Service Act to increase the powers and funding
of Amtrak, while limiting Department of Transportation control over
the funding of policies of the system. The Amtrak board of directors
has been changed by the addition of two more consumer representatives' 9 and by limiting the power of railroad-appointed directors
to vote in areas in which a conflict of interest might appear. 20 A
provision of the original Rail Passenger Service Act which required
Amtrak to rely upon railroads for the provision of employees was
21
deleted.
The new law confirms Amtrak's authority to institute auto-carrying passenger services. However, it also allows any person (except
a railroad which is a member of the Amtrak system) to provide
such a service.2 2 An independent railroad' could operate such service anywhere on its own lines; Auto-Train Corporation or similar
independent companies could provide such service by receiving a
certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Interstate
Commerce Commission. This legislative decision ended a dispute
in which Amtrak attempted to use its monopoly position under the
original Act to prevent Auto-Train from entering the Midwest-Florida market, although Amtrak did not provide any auto-ferrying service
on that route, and was attempting to remove its only conventional
passenger train from the line. 23 Since then, Auto-Train established
15. Id. at 25.
16. Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, tit. 11, 84 Stat. 1327 (1970), 84 Stat. 1830
(1972).
17. See Thorns, supra note 12, at 141.
18. Amtrak Improvement Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 548 (1973), 45 U.S.C. 543(a)(4) (Supp.
III 1973).
19. id. § 3, 45 U.S.C. 543(a) (4) (1973).
20. 87 Stat. § 3, 45 U.S.C. 543(a) (6) (1973).
21. Amtrak Improvement Act of 1973, § 4, 87 Stat. 548 (1973).
22. Amtrak Improvement Act of 1973, § 5, 87 Stat. 548 (1973).
23. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1972 at 71, col. 7.
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Louisville-Sanford service in 1974, while Amtrak abandoned plans to
add Indianapolis-Florida cars. to the Floridian during that year. 24
The law also prevents a railroad from refusing to participate with
Amtrak in establishing auto-ferry service on the grounds that a state
law makes such a service unlawful-this was intended to put a halt
to a carrier's delaying tactics in refusing to provide such auto-ferry
25
service for Amtrak.
The new law authorizes Amtrak to take all steps necessary to
assure that elderly and handicapped individuals have equal access
to trains, stations, and other facilities. 26 This is in line with stated
federal policy 27 to open up the world to our "invisible minority,"
who are often kept in a virtual state of house arrest due to faulty
design of access to buses, trains, planes and cars.2 In addition, the
right of eminent domain, by which many railroads and highways were
constructed in the past, is specifically granted to Amtrak. The corporation now has authority to condemn land for its own purposes, pro2
vided that just compensation is awarded to the landowners. 1
Angered by an Interstate Commerce Commission decision that
would have forced Amtrak, and the tax-payers, to bail out Penn Central's creditors by paying for common expenditures as well as avoidable costs, 30 the lawmakers declared that the basic level of costs to
be paid to the railroads is that which would not be incurred if
passenger service was not being provided by Amtrak. The intent of
Congress was that the railroads be relieved of continuing losses,
not that passenger service should be converted into a source of profit for them.-1 However, the law now provides for a system of
bonuses above the avoidable cost level for improvements in the
quality of service.2 2 Although Congress was particularly dissatisfied with the level of service rendered by Penn Central in the
Northeast Corridor, 2 the clarification of the law applies to all railroads.
A new section of the Amtrak law makes it mandatory, except
in emergencies, that Amtrak trains be accorded preference over
freights, unless the Secretary of Transportation has ruled otherwise
in special cases.3 4 The Secretary of Transportation was also given
24. News from National Association of R.R. Passengers, Oct. 1974 at 3.
25. Amtrak Improvement Act of 1973, § 5, 87 Stat. 548 (1973), Pub. L. No. 93.146.
26. Amtrak Improvement Act of 1973, § 6(c), 87 Stat. 548 (1973), Pub. L. No. 93-146.
27. Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C.A. 1612(a) (Supp. 1975).
28. See Note, The Forgotten Minority: The Physically Disabled and Improving Their
Physical Environment, 48 CHI-KENT L.R. 215 (1971).
29. Amtrak Improvement Act of 1973, § 6, 87 Stat. 548 (1973).
30. See 3 RAIL TRAVEL NEWSLETTER No. 18 at 3 (Sept. 1973).
31. Winter 1973-74 PASSENGER TRAIN JOURNAL 4, 25.
32. Amtrak Improvement Act of 1973, § 10, 87 Stat. 552 (1973) Pub. L. No. 93-146.
33. This is the heavily-traveled line between Boston and Washington. See Interview
with Sen. Claiborne Pell (D.-R.I.) In Passenger Train Journal, Winter 1971-72 at 16-18.
34. Amtrak Improvement Act of 1973, § 10, 87 Stat. 548 (1973), 87 Stat. 552 § 10, 45
U.S.C. 562(e) (1973).
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the power to rule on Amtrak's request for a higher speed limit for
35
its trains.
The law prohibited Amtrak from discontinuing any train until
July 1, 1974. 3 1 Under present travel conditions it seems unlikely, both
for economic and political reasons, that the skimpy Amtrak network
will contract any further. A new subsection requires Amtrak to add a
new experimental route each year, to operate for at least three
years.3 7 This is in addition to federally mandated extensions to
Laredo, Texas, via Little Rock and Dallas, to Canadian points and
to the San Joaquin Valley in California, as well as the state-supported "put up or shut up" services.3 9 The first such experimental
route designated by the Secretary was Boston to Chicago via Cleveland, as well as a Norfolk to Cincinnati line required by the appropriation bill. At this writing, the Cleveland route has not yet been
placed in operation.4 ° A third experimental route, between Washington and Denver via Kansas City,41 was announced on October 28, 1974.
This too, is not yet operational.
The Amtrak Improvement Act contains language which would
prohibit the White House or Department of Transportation from demanding information from Amtrak prior to its being submitted to Congress. 42 Concerned that the rail system would become too independent of the Department of Transportation and other federal transportation programs, Transportation Secretary Brinegar urged that President Nixon veto the measure. 43 However, the President overruled the
Secretary's recommendation and signed the Act. His stated reason
was that fuel shortages made utilization of energy-efficient passenger
trains and expansion of the system a necessity." It seems likely that
any veto of this issue might have been overridden by a hostile Congress in which railroad passenger service has been a traditionally
popular program. With the energy situation by no means permanently
settled, and with the possibility of a return to gasoline lines, curtailed air schedules and lower speed limits for highway vehicles which
make even slow passenger trains time-competitive, provision of rail
.35. Pub. L. No. 93-146, Id.
36. Amtrak Improvement Act of 1973, § 11, 87 Stat. 548 (1973), 87 Stat. 553 § 11, 45
U.S.C. 564(b) (1973).
87. Id. 87 Stat. 553 § 11, 45 U.S.C. 563(d) (1973).
38. National Railroad Passenger Corporation-Assistance, 86 Stat. 227 (1972), 86 Stat.
231, 45 U.S.C. 564 (1972).
39. Illinois, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Vest Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York
and Michigan are presently sponsoring additional Amtrak service by virtue of Sec. 403 of
the Act (45 U.S.C. 563). The states have obligated themselves to pay up to 2/3 of losses
Incurred on certain runs. it appears that these runs may be discontinued unilaterally by
Amtrak were the states to renege on their agreements.
40.

4 RAIL TRAVEL NEWSLE'IIER No.
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42. Amtrak Improvement Act of 1973, § 12, 87 Stat. 552 (1973).
43. Winter 1973-74 PASSENGER TRAIN JOURNAL 4, 25.
44. Id.
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passenger service is a necessary option to preserve mobility. Unfortunately, it appears that Amtrak is presently unprepared to handle
its unprecedented surge of traffic, lacking the rolling stock and control over operations to move people efficiently.45 Present orders for
new equipment will ease the growing pains, but this will not be avail46
able until late 1975 at the earliest.
The deficiencies in the Amtrak system were still apparent a year
later, when Congress again considered appropriations to subsidize
Amtrak's deficit. The resulting bill emerged as another "Improve4
ment"-the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1974. 7
The new law authorizes an additional $200 million dollars in fiscal'year 1975 for Amtrak operations, and raised the ceiling on federally guaranteed loans to Amtrak from $500 million to $900 million. 48
It also requires the Secretary of Transportation to issue guidelines
for Amtrak's capital and budgetary planning within 180 days of enactment, and to approve loan guarantee requests without further investigation if the Secretary found that the corporation had followed
49
those guidelines.
The 1974 Act limited the provisions of the Interstate Commerce
Act 50 in their application to Amtrak, inasmuch as the previous law
had prevented one railroad from owning more than one-third of Amtrak's stock. This was necessary because over one-half of the hitherto worthless stock had been purchased by the bankrupt Penn Cen5
tral. .
By the new law, Congress required Amtrak itself to repair and
maintain passenger equipment "to the maximum extent" practical
52
rather than rely on the shoddy work of contracting railroad shops.
The passenger corporation is authorized to provide assistance to government agencies in completing the Northeast Corridor Project authorized in the 1973 Regional Rail Reorganization Act;5 highest
priority is to be given this project.
Amtrak is directed to work with the Secretary of Transportation
in developing customs procedures on its international trains, and it
is now the Federal government, not Amtrak, which will pick up onethird of the deficit, when a state offers to cover two-thirds of the
loss 54 under the "Put up or Shut up" section of the Rail Passenger
45.

4 RAIL TrRAVEL NEWSLEwTER No. 7, at

18 (April 1974).

46. 4 RAIL TRAVEL NEWSLETTER No. 7, at 6 (April 1974).
47. Pub. L. No. 93-496 (1974).
48. 32 CONG. Q. 2989 (1974).
49. Id.
50. 49 U.S.C. 1 (1970).
51. RAILWAY AGE, May 31, 1971, ,t 14.
52. 32 CONG. Q. 2290 (1974).
53. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 985 (1978),
(1973).
54. 32 CONo. Q. 2290 (1974).

P.L. No.
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Service Act. 55 Furthermore, in designating new experimental routes
for Amtrak, the Amtrak Board of Directors is required to give priority to areas that do not have intercity rail service. 56 It appears the
next such route for 1975 will be between Ogden, Utah and Boise,
Idaho. Amtrak may not discontinue any currently operating route until October 1, 1976. 57
The new Act authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission to
institute civil actions against violators of ICC standards on adequacies
of service. The new Act also authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to conduct studies of a high-speed transit system linking major
West Coast cities and to design an intermodal transit terminal at
Washington, D. C., and establishes a federal-state program to preserve and convert to modern use old railroad stations of architectural
distinction. 58
Of particular interest to rural states such as North Dakota is a
provision directing the Secretary of Transportation to report to Congress within one year on the potential for integrating Amtrak rail
service with other modes of transportation such as buses. Particular
attention is to be paid to the problems and needs of rural areas. 59
For example, consideration should be given to co-ordinating the schedules of Amtrak trains with Greyhound buses at Grand Forks so as
to provide a reasonably convenient Chicago-Winnipeg service with an
across-the-platform connection.6o
The Amtrak Improvement Act of 1974 is a compromise between
a House version which included only the basic Amtrak authorization
and loan guarantee increase and a comprehensive Senate bill which
called for extensive service improvements, including new service to
each of the four continental states61 which have no Amtrak service.62
It was adopted by the Senate on October 10, 1974, and by the House
on October 15, and was signed into law at year's end by President
Ford. It indicates the Congress's willingness to continue reliance
upon the flawed instrument of Amtrak as a method of providing alternative transportation as a method of conserving petroleum. The
Amtrak Act has been further amended by Congress in 1975 to give
the corporation more control over its affairs. 63
55. 45 U.S.C. 563 (1970).
56. 32 CONG. Q. 2290 (1974).
57. Id.
58. Id.
.59.
Id.
60. UPPER GREAT PLAINS TRANSP. INST., REPORT ON AMTRAK IN NORTH DAKOTA (Oct.
1974).
61. "Maine, New Hampshire, South Dakota and Idaho. The latter does have service at
one station In Sand Point.
62. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1491, 92rd Cong., 2d Sess. 47-53 (1974) ; S. Rept. 93-1248 (1974).
63. Pub. L. 94-25, 89 Stat. 90 (1975).

778
II.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

THE EMERGENCY HIGHWAY ENERGY CONSERVATION ACT

As an aid in the conservation of fuel, various methods were utilized by states to reduce consumption. They included closing of gasoline stations on Sundays, local traffic measures to encourage use
of public transportation, alternate-day rationing, and reduction of
speed limits. The Iast was in use in most states, on the assumption
that the average car travels most efficiently at 50 miles per hour.
This assumption was challenged, however, by spokesmen for the intercity motor carrier industries, who claimed that heavy trucks and
buses were designed for turnpike speeds and reached maximum
fuel ecomomy at 65-70 mph. 64 For a short while, the Federal Highway Administration had seriously proposed a dual speed limit, 65 but
the views of terrified motorists, fearful of being passed by juggernaut
buses and trucks, prevailed. A nationwide speed limit of 55 miles
per hour was enacted by Congress in December 1973.66
The Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act,6 7 signed into law by President Nixon on January 2, 1974, provides that the
Secretary of Transportation shall not approve any funding of a highway project in any state which does not maintain a speed limit of
55 miles per hour as a maximum. In apparent answer to the cries
of the truck and bus lobbies, the act also denies funds to states
which maintain a speed limit which differentiates between different
classes of vehicles, if on November 1, 1973, the same limit applied
to cars, trucks, and buses. Lower speed limits may be applied to
certain overweight or 'oversize vehicles, and in emergency situations.
A strict construction of the act might require certain low speed limits to be raised, but at this writing this issue has not yet been

faced .68
The law also provides for federal assistance in changing speedlimit signs. 9 The lower speed limit was to expire on June 30, 1975,
or whenever the President declares that the fuel shortage is over. 70
The Secretary of Transportation is authorized to approve demonstration projects designed to encourage the use of carpools in urban
areas, including carpool and bus exclusive lanes. 7 1 The section does
not mention mass transit facilities, and is apparently thoroughly auto64. Truckers blocked highways in protest over the proposed speed limits. See 3 RAIL
TRAVEL NEWSLETTER No. 23 at 3 (Dec. 1973).
65. 3 RAIL TRAVEL NEWSLETTER No. 22 at 6 (Nov. 1978).
66. Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-239, 87 Stat. 1046
(1974).
67. Id.
68. Sec. 2(b)(2) of the Act requires that a four-lane divided highway which h.'d a
speed limit of 55 mph or more on Nov. 1, 1973 must maintain a 55 mph speed limit henceforth. Apparently states are not free to lower it. Incidentally, the law does not apply to
farm vehicles, trolley cars, or snowmobiles. Pub. L. No. 93-239, 87 Stat. 1047 § 2(c)(2)
(1974).
69. Id. § 2(d).
70. Id. § 2(e).
71. Id. § 3.
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oriented. Authority for such demonstration projects terminated on
December 31, 1974.
For years Congress has known that speed kills, but speed on
highways was only reduced in the name of saving gas, not lives.
Although it is too early to gauge its effectiveness in fuel conservation,
reported highway death tolls for 1974 have been significantly below
those for 1973, which impelled Congress to retain the lower speed
limits. With the time advantage of the car lessened, many riders
have shifted to trains and buses, thus diminishing pollution and traffic congestion as well as saving fuel.
Impressed by the concept, if not the enforcement, of lower
speed limits, Congress on December 18, 1974, cleared legislation making a permanent speed limit on federally-assisted highways of 55
miles per hour, still in the name of energy conservation. 72 The bill,
signed into law by President Ford in December, also increases
truck weights on interstate highways to a maximum of 80,000, a goal
sought by .trucking interests, but finally accepted as an energy-efficient solution.7"
III.

THE FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT OF 1973

For years, the sanctity of the Federal Highway Trust Fund 74 has
been inviolable. The concept of utilizing federal gasoline tax revenues
for road-building purposes has been long criticized, 75 but it has survived with a life of its own, nurtured by powerful lobbies ranging
from the American Automobile Association to the asphalt and concrete lobbies.7 6 Its greatest monument is the superb interstate highway system, conceived as a system of defense highways under President Eisenhower 77 and evolving into an all-embracing transportation
system that drastically changed the face of the nation's cities.
Even the emergence of federal aid to mass transportation sys78
temS
did not stop the growth of the interstate system and its
connecting highways, however inappropriate they might be to a given
city.7 9 Federal funds would cover 90 per cent of the cost of interstate highway construction,° whereas the most that could be expected was half the construction cost of mass transit facilities.,,
The 93rd Congress demolished the barrier of the trust fund's ex72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

H.R. 15427. See 32 CONG. Q. 3436 (Dec. 1974).
Id.
23 U.S.C. § 120 (1956).
See generally J. BURBY, THE GREAT AMERICAN MOTION SICKNESS (1971).
Id.
See D. Guy, STATE HIGHWAY CONDEMNATION PROCEDURES, 15-16 (1971).

78.

Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 962.

78.
79.
80.

Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act o 1970, 84 Stat. 962.
See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, 23 U.S.C. § 120 (1956).

81.

Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 962 (1970).
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clusivity in the passage of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973.82
Section 121 of this law, entitled "Public Transportation," diverts some
Highway Trust Fund money for urban public transportation for the
first time.88
The Act differentiates between bus and rail systems. Effective
with the fiscal year 1974, the Secretary may approve exclusive bus
lanes, traffic control devices for buses, bus shelters, loading areas,
and park-and-ride facilities. In fiscal year 1975, the Secretary may
approve utilization of highway funds up to $200,000,000 for the purchase of buses. Not until fiscal year 1976 may highway funds be
utilized for improvement and construction of rail facilities, including
4
the purchase of rolling stock.
The Act provides for urban officials to notify their state Highway
Department that a mass transit system is more acceptable than a
highway project. If State highway officials agree, the plan may be
submitted to the Secretary of Transportation for his approval. If the
Secretary approves, the project will be considered a "highway project" and funds shall be paid out of the Highway Trust Fund.8 5
The Secretary must be assured that the public mass transit system will actually use the project. After completion, the Highway
Administrator may authorize a state to make the improvements available to the transit system without charge.8 6 This section was inserted
\to prevent the completion of white elephants like the Cincinnati subway which has never seen a train since its construction.8 7
Enactment of this Highway Trust-busting measure is a victory for
the concept that cities and states should be free to select whatever
transportation system is best suited to its problems. It also is a reflection that many interests benefit from public transportation: passengers, motorists, property owners, employers, merchants, and environmentalists. It is unjust to require only the first of these groups to
bear the cost of maintaining such transit systems. However, the impetus for this law may well have been the energy crisis and the
necessity to create of public transit a viable alternative to the automobile.
IV.

THE REGIONAL RAIL REORGANIZATION ACT

Motivation for passage of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act 88
stemmed not so much from energy considerations as from the fail82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

23 U.S.C. § 142 (Supp. II1, 1973).
Id.
Id. § 142(a).
Id. § 142(e).
Id. § 142(g).
Abandoned subways also exist in Rochester, N.Y. and Los Angeles, Calif.
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 (1973).

TRANSPORTATION LEGISLATION

ure of the Penn Central"9 and other Northeastern railroads, the inv
feasibility of income-based reorganization of these lines, and the imminent prospect of liquidation of most of the railroad routes in the
Northeast.
Curtailment of highway traffic due to fuel shortages
brought a surge of freight business back to the rails, but the bankrupt Northeastern roads were in no shape to handle the traffic.91
Rejecting calls for both nationalization and a laissez-faire approach to disinvestment, Congress sought instead to attempt to reorganize the railroads of the region into a viable system, with a
system of subsidies to see them through until the rail lines could be
effectively rehabilitated and competing duplicative services elimin92
ated.
The Act calls for the establishment of a United States Railway
Association, (USRA) a governmental corporation, with an elevenmember board of directors, representing government, the railroad
industry, labor, state and local government, shippers and the financial world. 3 USRA is to develop a comprehensive plan for reorganization of the railroads within the Northeast and Midwest regions.
94
Such a plan is to have input from the Department of Transportation,
and the newly-created Rail Services Planning Office of the Interstate
Commerce Commission is to protect the interests of communities
and rail customers not adequately represented. 5 The final system
plan should create a financially self-sustaining rail system in the
region, by transferring some lines to the newly-created Consolidated
Rail Corporation, some to profitable railroads, some to Amtrak,
some to regional or local transportation authorities, and abandonment of the rest.96 Procedures for review by Congress and the courts
97
are included.
The Consolidated Rail Corporation, (Conrail) created by Title
III of the Act, 98 is an Amtrak-like (ostensibly for profit) non-governmental corporation which will be the operator of the lines designated
by USRA to remain as the core of the new system. The Act provides
89. See generally M. GARTNER, ed., RIDING THE PENNSY To RuiN (1971).
90. Bankrupt lines include Penn Central, Lehigh & Hudson River, Central of New Jersey, Ann Arbor, Erie Lackawanna, Lehigh Valley, Reading, and -Boston and Maine. Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corp., 95 S. Ct. 335, n.2 at 341 (1974).
91. See, TRAINS, Feb. 1975 at 4, 8-9.
92. See Albright, A Hell of a Way to Run a Government, NEw YORK TIMES MAGAZINE,
Nov. 3. 1974 at 14. This article explains how the Act (The Sharp-Adams Bill) was drafted
In the headquarters of the Union Pacific Railroad by Western railroaders, fearful of nationalization or loss of their eastern connecting lines. Albright characterizes both Amtrak
and Conrail as "Special Interest Socialism" to which railroad corporations are chief bene.
ficiaries.
93. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 988 § 201 (1974).
94. Id. § 204.
95. Id. 3 205.
96. Id. § 206.
97. Id. § 208-09.
98. Id. § 301.
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that lines that would otherwise be left out may be subsidized by involved communities on a put up or shut up basis. 99
Title V of the Act provides for job protection for life for all
employees with more than five years service. 100 It was this section
which caused doubts that the bill would be signed, but President
Nixon overruled advice from the Tranportation Department and
signed the bill into law on January 2, 1974.101

Most of the Act is concerned with preserving the Penn Central
and other lines for freight service, but provision has been made for
grants and loans for Amtrak to acquire certain lines, especially in
the Boston-Washington corridor, to operate on its own account and
to bring up to high-speed standards.1 0 2 In view of the need for energy conservation, conversion of this passenger trackage between
Boston and Richmond to all-electric operation is presently being considered. As the line from New Haven to Washington is already fully
electrified, extension of the system would not only save petroleum
fuels but would utilize Amtrak's equipment more efficiently. 03
The preliminary report of the Secretary of Transportation has
already been released.104 It calls for such drastic pruning of freight
trackage that it has been attacked in Congress as wasteful of energy.
It appears that the USRA plan will be less draconian in its approach,
especially since the views of the consumers will be heard through the
newly-mandated advocacy role of the Rail Services Planning office of
05
the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The main effect to date of the Regional Rail Reorganization
Act has been to keep Penn Central, largest of the bankrupts and
vital to the production and marketing of the steel and auto industries, intact and still rolling, by virtue of periodic loans and
grants. 0 6 The deadline stipulated by Congress for the USRA plan,
° had come
October 29, 1974,17
and gone; the task was more difficult than was envisioned, and Congress agreed to a new deadline
99. Id. § 304.
100. Id. § 505.
101. See Albright, supra note 92, at 105
102. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 § 601
(1974).
103. Presently the 150 miles between Boston and New Haven are operated by diesel
power, which means that Amtrak must maintain "captive" diesels at New Haven to handle
the east end of the operation. Electrification of the entire line would allow the METROLINEnS
to run through Boston, and a smaller number of locomotives would be needed to handle
through trains.
104.

RAIL SERVICE
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THE NORTHEAST AND MIDWEST REGIONS,

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF

TRANSPORTATION, Feb. 1, 1974 (3 vols.).
105. On May 2, 1974, the ICC declared itself to be in "fundamental disagreement" with
the DOT plan calling for the abandonment of 25 percent of the Northeastern railroads.
See RAIL SERVICES PLANNING OFFICE, EVALUATION OF THE U.S. RAILWAY ASSOCIATION'S PRELIMINARY SYSTEM PLAN (April 28, 1975).

106. Regional Rail Reorgoinization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 § 211
(1974).
107. Id. § 207. See Rice, Consolidated Rail Corporation, 42 ICC PRAc. J. 379 (1975).
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of February 26, 1975.108 During the time of planning by USRA, there
is a moratorium on railroad abandonments.109 However, the final
10
system may well eliminate an excess 10,000 miles of trackage."
Many similarities exist between the Conrail and Amtrak schemes.
Both owe their origin to the ideas of the late Dr. Paul Cherington
of M.I.T., whose last job was that of trustee to the bankrupt Boston
& Maine R.R. It was Cherington's idea that, although direct subsidies
to railroad coporations were unpalatable, railroad deficits could be
reduced by the process of "unloading" unwanted services, such as
passenger trains, commuter lines, and Northeastern freight service,
upon the government, as well as the cost of labor protection agreements."' Both laws involve government-sponsored "private, for profit" corporations, whose stockholders are the "unloading" railroads, 1
3
folboth laws involve moratoria on discontinuance of service,'
lowed by massive cutbacks by the new corporations.'" Both aim
at savings and eventual productivity through rationalization of routes
and centralized operation,1 15 and both contain "put up or shut up"
sections by which localities which would otherwise be stranded can
subsidize the cost of continued operation of routes within their
areas.116
Although the energy shortage is mentioned at least twice in the
Conrail Act's findings,' 7 and it is recognized that trains are the
most energy-efficient movers of freight, the main purposes of the act
seem to be economic, not conservationist. The damage to the business
and employment situation which would occur were the railroads to be
abandoned is unacceptable politically or economically. Conrail is not
cheap-the bill as enacted authorizes over $2 billion in direct grants,
loans and loan guarantees, and it appears this cost figure is artificially
low. It is submitted that in the long run, nationalization might be
a better answer.
The properties of the Penn Central, the nation's largest railroad, are valued at between two and fourteen billion dollars, depending upon whom you ask and whether the property is to be
used for transportation purposes or for scrap. Since the railroad
is in reorganization under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act," 8 the
108.
109.

Pub. L. No. 93-488 (1974).
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L.

No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 § 501(f)

(1973).
110.
111.

TRAINS, Feb. 1975 at 9.
See Albright, supra note 92, at 98.

112. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 § 301
(1973) ; 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1970).
113. Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 § 501(f) (1973) ;45 U.S.C. § 642 (1970).
114. Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 § 304 (1973) ; 45 U.S.C. § 564 (1970).
115. Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 § 402(a) (1973) ; 45 U.S.C. § 563 (1970).
116. Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 §§ 101(2), 401(a) (1973).
117. Albright, supra note 92, at 110.
118. 11 U.S.C. 205 (1973).
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creditors filed suit against the United States Railway Association,
seeking to have the Conrail statute declared unconsitutional, and
the railroad liquidated. They maintained that continued operation
of the railroad was eroding the bankrupt's estate and impairing
their rights to security. The creditors maintained that the government was condemning their property without just compensation, in
violation of the fifth amendment. The District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania agreed and held that the Conrail Act was
unconstitutional inasmuch as it pertains to the final conveyancing
of railroad properties,11 9 and inasmuch as it prohibits discontinuance
of rail service.
The Supreme Court reversed,'1 20 holding that the creditors were
not being deprived of their property; that some compensation was
provided by the Act, and that if the remedy provided by the Act
was insufficient, relief may be obtained in the Court of Claims
by virtue of the Tucker Act.121 In a strong dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas suggests that Congress had never intended the creditors to raid
the treasury through the Tucker Act, that the damages may well
amount to over ten billion dollars, and that the Court of Claims
must seek congressional approval to pay judgments over $100,000.
Congress, he stated, would be unwilling to appropriate such an
22
amount and the creditors would be left without a remedy.
To date the achievements of USRA have been minimal. The Boston & Maine Railroad is being reorganized outside the Act; ErieLackawanna tried to go it alone and 'is now petitioning the federal
court to be included in Conrail. USRA has dropped plans for a regional monopoly of all Eastern railroads, and an alternative plan
of controlled liquidation, with the bankrupts being sold off to the
healthy railroads. This latter scheme is now being pushed by the
Department of Transportation. USRA has considered these options:
a single big Conrail system with "neutral" terminal companies at
New York and Philadelphia, a breakup of Penn Central into its premerger components; and a fixed-plant scheme by which the government would acquire the track, fix it up and lease it to a privately
financed Conrail. 123 It has opted for a single Conrail-with competi24
tion from the Chessie System.1

119. F. Supp.(1973), noted at 95 S. Ct. 347 (1974).
120. Blanchette v. Conn. General Insurance Corp., 95 S. Ct. 335 (1974).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1974).
122. Blanchette v. Conn. General Insurance Corp., 95 S. Ct 385, 367-378
Comment, Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 49 ST. JOHN'S L.R. 98 (1974).
123. TRAINS, Feb. 1975 at 9.
124. Supra note 104.

(1974).
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CONCLUSION

Many of the changes in transportation regulation during the
period of the oil boycott did not arise from legislation, but from administrative or executive action. Significant among these were the
President's establishment of the Federal Energy Office, 1 25 the Interstate Commerce Commission's modification of gateway restrictions
to enable motor carriers to save on circuity and gasoline, 12 standards
of service for passenger trains,' and the Civil Aeronautics Board
approving agreements by which airlines would decide to jointly reduce the numbers of flights in competitive markets in order to save
2
fuel and eliminate wasteful duplication.1
It is difficult to assess the long-term future of energy sufficiency
or the effects of the new legislation. Transportation is one area
where a change in priorities can save not only fuel, but the environment and human lives as well.
At this writing, the energy crisis is still with us and President
Ford has proposed to utilize his authority to unilaterally raise oil
tariffs to curb consumption, and thus reduce dependence on foreign
oil. 29 Congress is seeking to force a postponement of the tariffs,
and New England governors are planning to seek a restraining order, claiming that the $3-a-barrel tariff to be imposed by the President
would put an unfair burden on the region, which depends on oil
(mostly imported) for 82 percent of its needs.'
In retrospect, it appears that congressional response was too
limited to meet the requirements of transportation needs and energy
conservation. Some of the programs called for by Congress were
not so much energy conservation as response to the pressure of important special interest groups. Sometimes their interests and that
of the public coincided, as with the Conrail bill, and sometimes there
was very little correlation between congressional purpose and effect.
An example was the Energy Transportation Security Act' 3' which
would have required between 20 and 30 percent of imported oil to
be carried in United States ships. Sponsored largely by maritime
unions, the bill passed both houses of Congress on the grounds of
protecting our flow of oil from Arab disruption, and as a means of
improving our balance of payments." 2 The bill was vetoed by President Ford in late December, and the matter is apparently still dead.
125. Executive order 11748 (Dec. 4, 1973).
126. Ex parte No. 55 (Sub No. 8), Nov. 15, 1973. See Shack, ICC Energy Policic
Procedures 41 ICC PRAc. J. 659 (1974).
127. Ex parte No. 277 (Sub. No. 1), Dec. 27, 1973.
128. American Airlines, Inc. et al., CAB Docket No. 25990, 38 F.R. 30769 (Nov. 7, 1973).
129. Wall St. Journal, Jan. 23, 1975, p. 7, c.1.
130. Wall St. Journal, Jan. 23, 1975, p. 7, c.2.
131. H.R. 8193 (1974).
132. 32 CONG. Q. 3370 (Dec. 1974).
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Congress failed to bring an adequate response to the transportation/energy crisis because of many factors, including lack of leadership from the White House, conflicting inputs from strongly-entrenched and regulated transportation interests that faced financial losses
if the transportation rate structure were upset, and the unwillingness
of the American motorist to separate himself from his car, largely
because few attractive alternatives exist. One political factor was
the widespread belief that the energy crisis was "phony", a belief
buttressed by large oil profits and the swiftness with which the gasoline shortage receded in March, 1974.
If the energy crisis is to be considerd a permanent fixture, Congress should be working now to improve the alternative means of
transportation, to avoid isolation of individuals and the Balkanization
of our economy.

